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ting judges to arbitrarily reject advisory jury verdicts, is an abuse of
sentencing discretion.
The Court rejected this argument, reasoning that the cited state-
ments do not indicate that the judges have divergent understandings of
the statutory requirement. Rather, they illustrate how different judges
have "considered" the jury's advice. It would be unreasonable to expect
that advisory verdicts would be treated uniformly in every case.
34
The result in Harris is not surprising, given the Court's holding in
Spaziano that states could, consistent with the Eighth Amendment, vest
sentencing authority in the judge and relegate the jury to an advisory
role.35 However, Justice O'Connor's statement that constitutional
questions involve more than mere numerical tabulation is questionable.
She has previously counted legislatures in determining the reach of the
Eighth Amendment,3 6 purportedly following the established doctrine
that the Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress ofa maturing society,"'37 and
34 115 S. Ct. at 1037.
35 Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 464-65.
36 SeeThompsonv. Oklahoma,487U.S. 815,849 (1988) ("[A]lmost
two-thirds of the state legislatures have definitely concluded that no 15-
year-old should be exposed to the threat of execution.") (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) and Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989) ('The
clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is
the legislation enacted by the country's legislatures. We have also
looked to data concerning the actions of sentencing juries.").
37 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
38 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,293 (1976) (jury
determinations and legislative enactments are two crucial indicators of
evolving standards of decency) and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
179-181 (1976) ("The legislatures of at least 35 States have enacted new
that both legislatures and juries are primary indicators of these stan-
dards.
38
The Court's decision in Harris has no direct application to Virginia
practice, as a jury sentence of life imprisonment is not reviewable in
Virginia. 39 However, after consideration of a post-sentence report and
upon good cause shown, 40 a judge may set aside a jury's sentence of
death and impose a sentence of life imprisonment.
41
While Virginia courts rarely override jury death sentences, the post-
sentencing hearing provides an opportunity for counsel to ensure that the
record is adequate to preserve appellate issues. It also allows counsel to
make and preserve new claims, one being that the Sixth Amendment
confrontation clause is violated by the sentencing court's consideration
of hearsay evidence contained in the post-sentence report.
42
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statutes that provide for the death penalty .... The jury also is a
significant and reliable objective index of contemporary values ....
This pivotal role of juries was simply not discussed in Harris.
39 Va.CodeAnn. § 19.2-264.4 (A) (1990) ("In cases oftrial byjury,
where a sentence of death is not recommended, the defendant shall be
sentenced to imprisonment for life.").
40 "Good cause shown" reiterates the rule applicable in all cases
when the court must consider altering a jury verdict. See Bassett v.
Commonwealth, 222 Va. 844,284 S.E.2d 844 (1981).
41 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.5 (1990).
42 Hearsay evidence contained in the post-sentence report can be
considered by the court at the sentencing phase. See O'Dell v. Common-
wealth, 234 Va. 672,364 S.E.2d 491 (1988).
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41 F.3d 920 (4th Cir. 1994)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
In 1983, Dennis Stockton was convicted, as a hiree, of the capital
murder of Kenneth Ardner and sentenced to death under the murder for
hire provision of Virginia's capital murder statute. 1 Under this section,
one is not guilty of capital murder unless the hiring element is proved.
The only witness wlio testified to the hiring agreement was Randy
Bowman, an inmate at a North Carolina prison at the time of trial.2
Bowman testified that he had not received any promises for testifying,
but that it was the right thing to do and that he hoped to benefit from it.
3
Stockton pursued appeals and collateral proceedings, was awarded
a resentencing hearing which resulted in another death sentence, and
continued to seek appellate relief.4
I Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(b) (1990).
2 A full description of the underlying facts can be found in Stockton
v. Commonwealth, 852 F.2d 740 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom.
3 Stockton v. Murray, 41 F.3d 920, 922 (4th Cir. 1994).
4 Id. at 923.
5 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that due process is violated when
material and exculpatory evidence is withheld from defendant).
The issues decided by the Fourth Circuit panel and included in
Stockton's fourth state habeas corpus petition involve claimed violations
of Brady v. Maryland5 and its progeny. Specifically, Stockton alleged
that (1) he was unaware, until defense counsel received a letter from the
Commonwealth's attorney in 1990, that the prosecutor had promised
Bowman that he (the prosecutor) would endeavor to get Bowman
transferred to another prison; and (2) that the prosecutor failed to turn
over a 1983 letter from Bowman in which Bowman threatened the
prosecutor that he would not testify unless the sentence he was serving
was reduced.
6
The Virginia courts found these claims to be procedurally barred
and the federal district court concurred in this finding. Stockton appealed
to the Fourth Circuit.
6 Stockton, 41 F.3d at 923. Another claim involved an allegation
that the prosecution withheld evidence that a second witness at Stockton's
trial, who alleged that Stockton had committed a second murder, had
mentioned an additional motive Stockton allegedly harbored for killing
Ardner. The claim was relatively unimportant compared to Stockton's
two other Brady claims, and the court's rejection of the claim was
probably correct. It will not be discussed further in this summary.
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HOLDING
A panel of the Fourth Circuit held that Stockton's Brady claims
were procedurally barred, that no acceptable excuse for the default had




L The Procedural Bar Ruling
The Virginia courts dismissed Stockton's fourth state habeas peti-
tion pursuant to Virginia's procedural default statute, Virginia Code
section 8.01-654(B)(2). The statute provides, "'No writ shall be granted
on the basis of any allegation the facts of which petitioner had knowl-
edge at the time of filing any previous petition.' 8 The Fourth Circuit,
however, seemed to construe the plain language of the default statute,
which triggers default upon omissions involving actual knowledge only,
as if it read "should have had knowledge." There are no indications that
Stockton argued that he had not defaulted his claims, though such an
argument may have been available. The court merely stated that since
Stockton's claims were found to have been defaulted by the Supreme
Court of Virginia, the Fourth Circuit would not hear them. 9
In Waye v. Murray10 the Fourth Circuit held that "a finding of
default under section 8.01-654(B) (2) establishes that 'all of the facts on
which the current petition was based were either known or available to
the petitioner years ago."'l 1
Once a claim has been deemed defaulted, the petitioner must
persuade the federal court to hear it. A showing of cause for default
coupled with a finding of prejudice to the petitioner in the event the
federal court refuses to hear the claim is the principle avenue of
persuasion. 12 A showing of cause requires that the petitioner show that
he not only had no previous knowledge of the facts underlying his claim,
but that he had no reasonable way of discovering those facts.
13 This is
the "should have known" standard which is in contrast with the "did
know" standard found in the Virginia default statute.
Even if Stockton did in fact default his claims, it is highly question-
able whether Stockton should have known of the specific promise the
prosecutor made to try to obtain a prison transfer for Bowman.
14
Contrary to the court's reasoning, the fact that Stockton mounted other
attacks on Bowman's credibility does not refute a claim that Stockton had
no knowledge and no reasonable way of knowing of the specific prison
transfer promise. 15
Similarly, the Commonwealth attorney's post hoc affidavit reciting
that he told Bowman of his limitations in fulfilling the transfers promise
does not vitiate the fact that the promise was made and that Bowman
7 Id. at 927.
8 Id. at 924 (emphasis added).
9 Id.
10 884 F.2d 765 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 936, (1989).
11 Id. (quoting Stockton v. Virginia, 113 S. Ct. 612(1992) (emphasis
added).
12 If Stockton could have shown cause, he could easily have shown
prejudice because Bowman was the only witness to an essential element
of capital murder.
13 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
14 Stockton v. Murray, 41 F.3d at 925.
15 Id. at 924.
16 Id. at 926.
17 "1 made it clear to Bowman at the time [prior to Stockton's trial]
that I could not make him any promises; I told him I would try." Id.
(quoting from the Virginia prosecutor's affidavit).
denied it on the stand. 16 In any event, the promise was to try to obtain
the transfer, not to bring it about. 17 Finally, Stockton's knowledge from
a civil suit that Bowman had told other inmates that Gregory, the
Commonwealth's investigator, had "promised him things" does not
answer the issue either. In the court's view, however, Stockton could
have "marshalled his facts" before filing his fourth state habeas petition
and, therefore, could have uncovered the specific promises the prosecu-
tor withheld until 1990.18
II. The Merits of the Brady Claim
The Fourth Circuit, while denying the obligation to do so, "in an
exercise ofcare," considered the merits of the claims and rejected them. 19
Giglio v. UnitedStates20 held that evidence which has a tendency to
undermine a witness' credibility is exculpatory evidence within the
definition of that phrase from Brady. In deciding that the letter from
Bowman to the prosecutor was not exculpatory evidence, the court
focused on what it concluded that Bowman thought, rather than what the
prosecutor did or failed to do. The prosecutor failed to correct the perjury
committed as Bowman claimed that he was not promised anything, was
motivated by a desire to "do the right thing," and was merely hoping that
his testimony would improve his condition in general. The effect the
promises and the content of the letterhad on Bowman's credibility should
have been forthejury to decide. Bowman's subjective knowledge that the
prosecutor could not force the North Carolina authorities to reduce his
sentence or transfer him to another facility is not determinative of the
prosecutor's Brady obligation.
Because Bowman said on the stand that he felt testifying was the
right thing to do, though he hoped to benefit therefrom, the 1983 threat
in writing not to testify was also material to the credibility of his
"goodness of his heart" trial testimony. Here, the court reversed its
method of analysis and erroneously found that what the prosecutor did
was determinative, as it ruled that since there was no evidence that the
prosecutor acceded to Bowman's demand, the letter was not within
Brady.2 1 The inconsistency of the content of the letter with Bowman's
trial testimony, not solely whether Bowman received consideration for
the testimony, was relevant to Bowman's credibility.
HI. Conclusion
If appellate courts insist upon circumventing and undermining
Brady and its progeny, there is little that counsel can do to prevent it.
22
There are, however, specific actions defense counsel can take to make it
more difficult for appellate courts to side step Brady issues. Foremost
among these is investigation and more investigation. 23
18 Id. at 925.
19 Id.
20 405 U.S. 150 (1972); see alsoDozier v. Commonwealth, 219 Va.
1113, 253 S.E.2d 655 (1979).
21 Stockton, 41 F.3d at 927.
22 Some encouragement may be found by the United States
Supreme Court's grant of certiorari to Kyles v. Whitley, 114 S. Ct. 1610,
case below, 5 F.3d 806 (5th Cir. 1993), a case which raises the issue of
whether the prosecution has an independent duty to disclose Brady
material to defense counsel apart from a request for such material. The
Court, through Kyles, may directly address the meaning of exculpatory
evidence once again and relieve defense attorneys of the burden to
speculate correctly about what evidence the Commonwealth possesses.
23 For further discussion of the importance of investigation, see
case summary of Schulp v. Delo, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
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Counsel should use all available means to obtain information in
addition to the formal discovery process. In regard to discovery, counsel
should make requests as particular and specific as possible, thereby
limiting the courts' ability to recharacterize the requests as requests
which do not encompass the Brady material later found to have been
withheld. In addition, every request or demand must be made on the
record and must require that the trial judge rule on each and every piece
of information requested. Even in "open file" jurisdictions, the record
must reflect what was demanded, the response made, and exactly what
material defense counsel received, and when it was received.
Summary and analysis by:
Angela Dale Fields
WEEKS v. COMMONWEALTH
248 Va. 460, 450 S.E.2d 379 (1994)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
Late on the night of February 23, 1993, twenty year-old Lonnie
Weeks was travelling southbound on 1-95 between Washington and
Richmond with his twenty-one year-old uncle, Lewis J. Dukes, Jr.1
Dukes was driving the car at a high rate of speed when they passed the
vehicle of Virginia State Trooper Jose M. Cavazos around midnight.
Dukes eventually stopped the car on the Dale City exit ramp, where
Trooper Cavazos pulled up behind them.2 Trooper Cavazos asked the
two men to get out of the car. Dukes complied, but as Weeks exited, he
drew a pistol and shot the officer at least six times. Trooper Cavazos died
several minutes later.
3
Weeks and Dukes left the scene in their vehicle and stopped at a gas
station.4 Soon after at a nearby motel, another police officer stopped and
questioned Weeks and Dukes. They volunteered information about the
shooting, claiming they had "heard the shots" while in the motel parking
lot.5 Subsequent suspicious behavior on the part of Weeks and Dukes
prompted the police officers on the scene to detain them with their
consent.6 State police Special Agent J.K. Rowland advised Weeks that
he was "free to leave" but then read Weeks Miranda warnings. Weeks
wrote on the "Advice of Rights" form: "Do not want to discuss case
further."7 Meanwhile, Dukes told another police officer that Weeks had
I Weeks v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 460,464,450 S.E.2d 379,382-
83 (1994).
2 Id. at 464, 450 S.E.2d at 383.
3 Id. at 465, 450 S.E.2d at 383.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 466, 450 S.E.2d at 383-84.
6 Id. at 466-67, 450 S.E.2d at 384.
7 Id. at 468,450 S.E.2d at 385.
8 Id. at 469, 450 S.E.2d at 385.
9 Id.
l Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(6) (Supp. 1994).
11 Weeks, 248 Va. at 463,450 S.E.2d at 382.
12 Id. at 464,450 S.E.2d at 382.
13 Id. at 478-79, 450 S.E.2d at 390-91.
14 As noted in the text, Weeks commendably raised forty-seven
assignments of error for appeal, although the Supreme Court of Virginia
refused to consider ten of these errors since they were not briefed or
argued. For further information on these ten errors, see Section III and
the text accompanying Footnote 62 infra. As to some of the remaining
thirty-two issues, either the court summarily rejected them, they did not
involve death penalty law, or the court applied broad and well-settled
principles of law to situations which are too fact-specific to be useful
shot the trooper. When this police officer informed Rowland of Dukes'
account, Rowland arrested Weeks. 8 Later, at about 6:00 p.m. that
evening (February 24), Rowland asked Weeks if he remembered the
rights read to him earlier that day. Weeks answered that he did, was
questioned further, and soon confessed to shooting the trooper. 9
Weeks was indicted for capital murder for the willful, deliberate,
and premeditated killing of a police officer for the purpose of interfering
with the police officer's performance of official duties;10 grand larceny
of a motor vehicle; and use of a firearm in the commission of murder. 11
The jury later found Weeks guilty of capital murder and sentenced him
to death based on the "vileness" aggravating factor. After considering a
probation officer's report and the probation officer's testimony relating
to punishment, the court upheld the sentence of death.
12
HOLDING
Deciding his appeal and conducting its statutory review, the Su-
preme Court ofVirginiaheld that Weeks' sentencehad notbeen imposed
under passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factor, and that the sentence
was not excessive or disproportionate to penalties imposed in similar
cases. 13 The court also rejected all of his forty-seven assignments of
error 14 and affirned the conviction and sentence of death.15
generally. These issues include: (1) the constitutionality of Weeks's
two-hour detention without arrest; (2) the trial court's denial of Weeks's
motion to suppress his confession, based on the failure of authorities to
scrupulously honor Weeks's request to remain silent (more specifically,
the court's application of the five factors in the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975), used to
determine whether re-interrogation of a criminal defendant, once that
defendant has exercised his Miranda rights, is constitutional-see
Bieber, Commonwealth v. Burket: Don't Put All Your Defense Eggs in
the Suppression Basket, Capital Defense Digest, this issue); (3) the trial
court's error in denying individual voir dire; (4) the trial court's error in
denying Weeks' challenge for cause to ajuror whose wife's first cousin
had been a police officerkilled in the line of duty; (5) the trial court's error
in permitting hearsay testimony concerning statements of Dukes to
investigators that Weeks had killed the trooper, (6) the trial court's error
in denying Weeks's motion to strike the Commonwealth's evidence of
capital murder based on the evidence's failure to prove premeditation
sufficiently. Of the remaining issues, the trial court stated that it had
"considered all the arguments in support of those issues, and conclude[d]
that none ha[d] any merit." Weeks, 248 Va. at 476, 450 S.E.2d at 390.
15 Weeks, 248 Va. at 479,450 S.E.2d at 391.
